

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LILONGWE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 053341

EXDIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

C R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 7, UNN SUB PARA 3, LAST
LINE WORD CONCESSIONS INSERTED

E.O. 11652:XGDS - 2

TAGS:PDEV, RH, UK, SF

SUBJECT: SUPPLEMENTAL TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH PRESIDENT
NYERERE

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REF: A) STATE 49706; B) DAR 0831 ; C) DAR 0818

1. TALKING POINTS IN REF (A) WERE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE YOU
AND YOUR BRITISH COUNTERPART WITH FRAMEWORK FOR ENGAGING
NYERERE IN A DIALOGUE ON HOW TOGETHER WE MIGHT PROCEED
FROM HERE TOWARD RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT BASED ON PRINCIPLES
OF ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS. WE RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THAT
NYERERE, IN YOUR PRIVATE FEBRUARY 27 DISCUSSION, HAS
ALREADY BEGUN SUCH A DIALOGUE GOING BEYOND THE QUESTIONS
WHICH POINTS IN REF (A) WERE DESIGNED TO COVER. WE ALSO

RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANT ROLE NYERERE IS LIKELY TO PLAY AMONG FL PRESIDENTS IN HELPING US MOVE PRESENT SITUATION TOWARD ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION.

2. WITH THIS IN MIND WE HAVE PREPARED ADDITIONAL TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR USE IN CASE NYERERE CHOOSES TO CALL YOU IN PRIVATELY FOLLOWING YOUR JOINT DEMARCHE WITH BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER. YOU SHOULD NOT SEEK SUCH A MEETING. FOR YOUR BACKGROUND ONLY, WE WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME OF THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT WENT INTO THEIR PREPARATION.

3. AS WAS OBVIOUS FROM OUR DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON, OWEN IS RELUCTANT IN THE EXTREME TO ENGAGE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IN ANOTHER ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS ON THE AAP. HE FEARS, UNDERSTANDABLY, THAT SUCH AN EFFORT WOULD BE VIEWED BY HIS DOMESTIC CRITICS AS AN ATTEMPT TO IGNORE OR AT WORST UNDERMINETHE SALISBURY TALKS, WHILE CATERING TO THE FRONT'S EXTREME DEMANDS. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE HAS ACKNOWLEDGED IN PRINCIPLE THAT WE CANNOT AFFORD TO BE SEEN TO BE UNWILLING TO CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRONTON OUR PROPOSALS. A REFUSAL TO MEET WOULD END OUR CREDIBILITY AND INFLUENCE WITH THE FRONT LINE AND, WITH
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IT, ANY HOPE WE MIGHT HAVE OF BRINGING ABOUT A SOLUTION INVOLVING ALL THE PARTIES. THIS POINT WAS STRESSED IN THE SECRETARY'S LETTER TO OWEN ACCOMPANYING OUR PROPOSED TALKING POINTS. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT HE CLEARLY SHARED OWEN'S VIEW THAT WE SHOULD NOT CHASE AFTER THE FRONT. HAVING OFFERED AT MALTA AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO MEET AGAIN WITH THE FRONT, WE FEEL THAT THE INITIATIVE FOR SCHEDULING ANOTHER MEETING CLEARLY RESTS WITH THEM.

4. SECONDLY, IF A MEETING IS TO TAKE PLACE, IT MUST BE CLEAR IN ADVANCE THAT IT HOLDS A REASONABLE CHANCE OF REACHING AGREEMENT. ANOTHER MEETING THAT ENDS IN FAILURE TO PRODUCE AGREEMENT ON BASIC PRINCIPLES WOULD MAKE IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE BRITISH OR OURSELVES TO JUSTIFY CONTINUED PURSUIT OF OUR PROPOSALS, ESPECIALLY IN THE FACE OF ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS IN SALISBURY. IT WOULD ALSO END WHATEVER CHANCE MIGHT EXIST FOR BRINGING ALL THE PARTIES TOGETHER ON THE BASIS OF OUR PROPOSALS. REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD REQUIRE A READINESS ON THEIR PART TO ACCEPT OUR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS. THESE INCLUDE:

-- THE SUPREME AUTHORITY OF THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER DURING THE TRANSITION, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO THE POLICE AND ARMED FORCES.

-- PARTICIPATION ON AN EQUAL BASIS BY ALL THE PARTIES
IN THE TRANSITION POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS, SPECIFICALLY
THE GOVERNING COUNCIL.

--THE PRESENCE OF A UN FORCE DURING THE TRANSITION TO
ASSIST THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER IN MAINTAINING LAW AND
ORDER.

-- RETENTION, LARGELY INTACT, OF THE EXISTING POLICE
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FORCE AS THE PRINCIPAL INSTRUMENT FOR MAINTAINING LAW
AND ORDER DURING THE TRANSITION, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THAT
THE PF DROP ITS DEMAND FOR THE INTEGRATION OF ITS POLICE
CADRE WITH THE EXISTING POLICE FORCE.

-- ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF LORD CARVER'S PLANS FOR
IMPLEMENTING A CEASEFIRE AND CREATING A NEW ZIMBABWE ARMY.

IT WILL HAVE TO BE MADE CLEAR THAT NO AGREEMENT IS
POSSIBLE UNLESS THE PF IS PREPARED TO MEET OUR MINIMUM
ESSENTIALS. IN RETURN, WE BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE
TO INCLUDE SOME ADDITIONAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES
DESIGNED TO MEET THE CONCERNS OF PF AND THE OTHER
NATIONALISTS TO ASSURE BOTH THE IRREVERSIBILITY AND THE
ESSENTIAL FAIRNESS OF THE PROCESS LEADING TO MAJORITY
RULE AND INDEPENDENCE.

5. THE THIRD CONSIDERATION, AND THE ONE THAT POSES THE
GREATEST DIFFICULTY FOR BOTH THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES,
IS WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF WE WERE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT IN
PRINCIPLE WITH THE PF. IT IS CLEAR THAT UNDER PRESENT
CIRCUMSTANCES, AND SO LONG AS THE NEGOTIATIONS IN SALISBURY
ARE CONTINUING, OUR PREVIOUS COMMITMENT TO THE FRONT LINE
TO TAKE WHATEVER STEPS ARE NECESSARY, INCLUDING SANCTIONS,
TO IMPLEMENT OUR PROPOSALS CANNOT BE INVOKED AUTOMATICALLY.
PUBLIC OPINION BOTH HERE AND IN THE UK WOULD NEITHER
UNDERSTAND NOR SUPPORT SUCH A MOVE. NOR DO WE BELIEVE
SUCH A COURSE WOULD BE EFFECTIVE GIVEN LIKELY SOUTH
AFRICAN RESISTANCE. WHILE WE ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE
THAT THE AFRICANS, ESPECIALLY NYERERE, ALREADY UNDER-
STAND THIS, THE PROBLEM OF SPELLING IT OUT FOR THEM
REMAINS A DELICATE ONE. WHAT WE CAN SAY TO THEM IS THAT
IN THE ABSENCE OF PF AGREEMENT, A CONTINUED EFFORT TO
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BRING ABOUT A SOLUTION BASED ON OUR PROPOSALS WILL BE
IMPOSSIBLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, PF ACCEPTANCE OF OUR
PROPOSALS WOULD PUT CONSIDERABLY PRESSURE ON THE PARTIES
TO THE SALISBURY TALKS AND STRENGTHEN OUR HAND IN FUTURE

DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM ON THE AAP.

6. IN SUM, OUR ABILITY TO PROCEED WITH DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PF ON OUR PROPOSALS DEPENDS UPON A CLEAR INDICATION FROM THEM AND THE FRONT LINE THAT THEY WANT TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AND ARE PREPARED TO MEET US ON ESSENTIALS, AND THAT THE AUTOMATIC LINKAGE BETWEEN THEIR ACCEPTANCE AND OUR TAKING IMMEDIATE STEPS TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN CAN NO LONGER BE INVOKED. THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS ARE DESIGNED TO BEGIN TO DRAW NYERERE INTO A DIALOGUE ON THESE ISSUES. WE WILL HAVE TO LEAVE IT TO YOUR JUDGMENT, HOWEVER, AS TO HOW FAR AND HOW FAST WE CAN PURSUE THIS

DIALOGUE AT THIS STAGE IN HIS THINKING.

7. BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS:

-- WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT OUR PROPOSALS OFFER THE BEST HOPE OF ACHIEVING A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IN RHODESIA, BUT WE FEAR THAT TIME IS RUNNING OUT ON OUR PROSPECTS FOR REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THE PARTIES ON THE BASIS OF THEM.

-- IN THE ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT TO OUR PROPOSALS BY ANY OF THE PARTIES, AND IN THE FACE OF THE ONGOING TALKS IN SALISBURY, IT HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR US TO JUSTIFY OUR CONTINUED PURSUIT OF THE PLAN.

-- WE CAN NO LONGER AFFORD TO ASSUME THAT THE SALISBURY TALKS WILL FALL OF THEIR OWN WEIGHT. THE NATIONALIST PARTIES IN SALISBURY SEEM DETERMINED TO REACH AGREEMENT AND TO MOVE TO ESTABLISH AN INTERIM
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GOVERNMENT, EVEN IF THIS MEANS MAKING SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS TO SMITH.

-- IN LARGE MEASURE, THIS DETERMINATION STEMS FROM THEIR APPARENT BELIEF THAT THEY HAVE NOWHERE ELSE TO GO AND THAT OUR PROPOSALS, IF IMPLEMENTED, WOULD PLACE THEM AT A SEVERE DISADVANTAGE IN ANY POLITICAL CONTEST WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM, WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO REASSURE THEM THAT OUR PROPOSALS WOULD GIVE AN EQUALLY FAIR CHANCE AT ELECTORAL VICTORY TO ALL THE PARTIES; BUT THESE ASSURANCES HAVE BEEN AND WILL REMAIN INSUFFICIENT UNLESS THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ARE ALSO PREPARED TO INDICATE THEIR READINESS TO RESERVE A PLACE FOR THEM IN A SETTLEMENT.

-- IF THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF OUR PROPOSALS IS MISSED, IT IS LIKELY TO

BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO COME CLOSE TO AGREEMENT ON
SIMILAR TERMS IN THE FUTURE.

-- AS WE HAVE ALREADY INDICATED, ANOTHER MEETING WITH
THE PF THAT ENDS IN DISAGREEMENT IN BASIC PRINCIPLES
WOULD BE EXTREMELY HARMFUL TO OUR CAUSE AND WOULD ONLY
ADD IMPETUS TO THE TALKS IN SALISBURY.

-- TO AVOID THIS, WE MUST HAVE SOME INDICATION THAT
THE PF SERIOUSLY WANTS ANOTHER MEETING AND THAT THEY
ARE PREPARED TO AGREE TO OUR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS (AS
OUTLINED IN PARA 4 ABOVE).

-- TO MINIMIZE THE POLITICAL RISKS OF FAILING TO
REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE PF ON THESE POINTS, AS WELL
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AS TO PRESERVE OUR ABILITY TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS WITH
THEM IN THE FUTURE, IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE THAT THERE BE
A PRELIMINARY MEETING AT A SOMEWHAT LOWER, TECHNICAL
LEVEL.

-- AN AGREEMENT ON BASIC PRINCIPLES WITH THE PF WOULD
GREATLY STRENGTHEN OUR ABILITY AND THAT OF THE BRITISH
TO BRING THE PARTIES IN SALISBURY BACK INTO A SERIOUS
DISCUSSION OF OUR PROPOSALS. ABSENT AGREEMENT WITH THE
PF, A SERIOUS EFFORT ON OUR PART TO BRING ABOUT A SOLUTION
BASED ON OUR PROPOSALS WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE.

-- WE MUST POINTOUT IN ALL CANDOR THAT UNDER PRESENT
CIRCUMSTANCES, ACCEPTANCE BY THE PF OF OUR PROPOSALS
WOULD NOT IN ITSELF ENABLE US TO PRESS AHEAD WITH MEASURES
TO IMPLEMENT OUR PROPOSALS SO LONG AS THE TALKS WITH
SALISBURY ARE CONTINUING. AT MINIMUM, WE WOULD ALSO
NEED AN INDICATION THAT MUZOREWA OR SITHOLE WOULD BE
PREPARED TO ENDORSE OUR PROPOSALS. THIS AGAIN UNDER-
SCORES THE NEED FOR ALL OF US TO MAINTAIN OUR LINES OF
COMMUNICATION AND TO REFRAIN FROM INFLAMMATORY PUBLIC
STATEMENTS.

-- EVEN IF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT IS ESTABLISHED IN
SALISBURY, THE PF'S ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PROPOSALS WOULD
PROVIDE US WITH A FRAMEWORK FOR CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS
AIMED AT BRINGING THE PARTIES TOGETHER.

-- WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS ON HOW, GIVEN THE
POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS UNDER WHICH WE ARE NOW COMPELLED
TO OPERATE, WE TOGETHER CAN MOVE THE SITUATION TOWARD
A SOLUTION INVOLVING ALL THE PARTIES.

8. FOR LUSAKA: WHILE WE THINK KAUNDA IS LESS LIKELY
THAN NYERERE TO BE UNDERSTANDING OF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED

IN THE FOREGOING POINTS, WE LEAVE TO YOUR JUDGMENT

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HOW MUCH OF THE ABOVE IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO DRAW
UPONIN YOUR FUTURE DISCUSSION WITH HIM.

9. FOR INFO ADDRESSEES: FOREGOING IS INTENDED FOR
YOUR BACKGROUND AND INFORMATION ONLY. VANCE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 26 sep 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PRESIDENT, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, INTERIM GOVERNMENT, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, CAT-B, NEGOTIATIONS, NATIONALISTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 02 mar 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE053341
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: MOOSE
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 XGDS - 2
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: P840176-1524, D780111-0910
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t197803126/baaafbzc.tel
Line Count: 284
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 64675ebb-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS NODIS
Reference: A) STATE 49706; B) DAR 0831 ; C) DAR 0818
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 27 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3165514
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SUPPLEMENTAL TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE
TAGS: PDEV, RH, ZI, UK, SF, TZ, (NYERERE, JULIUS K)
To: DAR ES SALAAM INFO LONDON MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/64675ebb-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014